University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1997 | Issue 1

Article 17

Chemical Contamination in California: A
Continuing Nuisance
Robert E. King
Robert.King@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
King, Robert E. () "Chemical Contamination in California: A Continuing Nuisance," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1997: Iss.
1, Article 17.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1997/iss1/17

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Chemical Contamination in California:
A Continuing Nuisance?
Robert E. Kingt
Nuisance claims have emerged as a controversial method of
combating environmental pollution. Plaintiffs often rely upon
continuing nuisance claims in cases of soil and groundwater
contamination. Such charges allow for successive suits with the
statute of limitations running from the time of the last injury. In
contrast, defendants prefer to characterize the same types of
chemical pollution as permanent nuisances. Permanent nuisances
trigger typical three-year statutes of limitations and preclude
future litigation after the initial suit. As a result, courts have
become embroiled in determining whether chemical contamination constitutes a permanent or continuing nuisance.
California has emerged as a leader in the chemical contamination nuisance controversy. Favoring continuing nuisances on
both equity and public policy grounds, California courts employ a
"reasonably abatable" standard to adjudicate environmental
nuisance claims. Despite its preference for continuing nuisances,
however, California's lack of standards in chemical contamination
nuisance cases causes considerable legal confusion. The state's
failure to establish uniform criteria to distinguish continuing
from permanent nuisances leads to inconsistent judicial outcomes, creates expensive litigation delays, and ultimately hinders
environmental protection. In response, California should continue
its national environmental leadership by adopting straightforward and workable standards to define permanent and continuing nuisances.
This Comment contains three parts. Part I provides an
overview of nuisance claims and California's progressive support
for chemical contamination nuisance claims. Part II discusses the:
need for standards based upon the issue's importance and.
California's muddled jurisprudence. Part II also furnishes a
"Plaintiffs Checklist" to summarize what California courts
deemed as sufficient evidence to prove environmental continuing

t B.S.F.S. 1992, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.,
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nuisance claims. Finally, Part III proposes uniform standards in
an effort to eliminate current confusion. Definitive, consistent
standards clarify the law and promote equitable outcomes; litigants, the courts, and the public deserve nothing less in protecting the environment.
I. BACKGROUND
California has emerged as a leader in environmental nuisance litigation. With its large geographic area and increasing
development, California boasts a disproportionate number of
chemical contamination sites.1 In response to its burgeoning
environmental problems, the state utilizes its progressive nuisance statute, 2 together with common law jurisprudence, to adjudicate pollution disputes.
California defines a nuisance as "[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . ."' A public nuisance is a nuisance "which affects at the same time an entire
community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons,"4 while a private nuisance, the topic which this Comment
will examine, is any nuisance not included within the public
nuisance definition.5 Although laying a broad foundation suitable
for chemical contamination claims,' the expansive statute provides little specific guidance to courts for distinguishing between
permanent and continuing nuisances. Consequently, California
courts turn to the common law for further clarification on the

' James B. Brown and Glen C. Hansen, Nuisance Law and Petroleum Underground
Storage Tank Contamination:Plugging the Hole in the Statutes, 21 Ecol L Q 643, 646
(1994) (The State of California has more than its fair share of contamination problems
resulting from leaking USTs [underground storage tanks, a leading cause of groundwater
contamination]. It is estimated that approximately 170,000 USTs are located in the state,
and of those more than 20 years old, 50% may be leaking.").
2 Cal Civ Code §§ 3479-3508 (West 1970 & Supp 1997). See Brown and Hansen, 21
Ecol L Q at 647 (cited in note 1) (lauding the statute as "especially progressive ... [and a
source of] valuable national precedent.")
3 Cal Civ Code § 3479.
Cal Civ Code § 3480.
Cal Civ Code § 3481.
In discussing California's sweeping nuisance definition, one court noted that "[tihe
statutory definition of nuisance appears to be broad enough to encompass almost any
conceivable type of interference with the enjoyment or use of land or property." Stoiber v
Honeychuck, 101 Cal App 3d 903, 919, 162 Cal Rptr 194 (Cal App 1980).
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thorny distinction between permanent and continuing nuisances.7
The common law starkly contrasts permanent and continuing
nuisances. In California, "a permanent nuisance is considered to
be a permanent injury to property for which damages are assessed once and for all, while a continuing nuisance is considered
to be a series of successive injuries for which the plaintiff must
bring successive actions."8 The California Supreme Court has
consistently adhered to this distinction between permanent and
continuing nuisances."
Abatability is the essential element 0 of a continuing nuisance." "[Ifl an encroachment.., is abatable, the law does not
presume that such an encroachment will be permanently maintained. The maintenance of such an encroachment is a continuing... nuisance." 2 Plaintiffs may bring successive actions for
actual, but not prospective, damages until the defendants abate
the nuisance.13 Some examples of continuing nuisances include
noise, noxious odors, 5 and even solid structures such as a leaning wall. 8
California courts define a permanent nuisance as an action
where "by one act a permanent injury is done," leading to damages assessed "once [and] for all." 7 Courts developed the permaSee Brown and Hansen, 21 Ecol L Q at 664 (cited in note 1) ("In order to practically utilize this ephemeral nuisance statute, the California courts have turned to the!
common law.... [The practical application of section 3479 is only possible by dovetailing
it with the common law requirements for a nuisance claim.").
" Beck Development Co., Inc. v Southern Pacific TransportationCo., 44 Cal App 4th
1160, 1216, 52 Cal Rptr 2d 518 (Cal App 1996).
See Mangini v Aerojet-General Corp., 12 Cal 4th 1087, 51 Cal Rptr 2d 272 (1996)
Baker v Burbank-Glendale-PasadenaAirport Authority, 39 Cal 3d 862, 218 Cal Rptr 293
(1985); Spaulding v Cameron, 38 Cal 2d 265, 239 P2d 625 (1952).
" A less commonly used test suggests that "[tihe salient feature of a continuing....
nuisance is that its impact may vary over time." Field-Escandon v DeMann, 204 Cal App
3d 228, 234, 251 Cal Rptr 49 (Cal App 1988). However, the California Supreme Court has
affirmed that the integral difference between a permanent and continuing nuisance is the
ability to abate the nuisance at any time. Baker, 39 Cal 3d at 868-70. Consequently, while
courts may utilize the varying impact test to confirm the initial abatability decision, most
courts employ the abatability test. Spar v Pacific Bell, 235 Cal App 3d 1480, 1485-86, 1.
Cal Rptr 2d 480 (Cal App 1991).
" Kafka v Bozio, 191 Cal 746, 751, 218 P 753 (1923).
12 Id.
'3

Baker, 39 Cal 3d at 869.

Vowinckel v N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal 156, 158-59, 13 P2d 733 (1932) (pottery
factory blaring noise and spewing soot).
1" Tracy v Ferrera,144 Cal App 2d 827, 828, 301 P2d 905 (Cal App 1956) (neighbor's
pipes and furnaces emitting foul smells).
16Kafha, 191 Cal at 751-52 (deeming wall tilting after earthquake to be a continuing
nuisance because the defendant could have braced or removed the offending structure
altogether).
7 Williams v Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 150 Cal 624, 626, 89 P 599 (1907), quoting
'
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nent nuisance category as an exception to the rule that all nuisances are abatable and therefore continuing. 8 In practice,
courts strictly limit permanent nuisances to situations where
injunctive relief is impractical or where repeated lawsuits are
undesirable. 9 Plaintiffs may obtain past, present, and future
damages in permanent nuisance claims.20 Prior permanent nuisances include sewer lines buried under a plaintiffs land,2' a
railroad operating across a plaintiffs property,22 or a public utility company's operations."
The running of the statute of limitations is perhaps the most

important difference between permanent and continuing nuisances. For permanent nuisances, the statute runs from the creation
of the nuisance,2 4 barring any claims asserted after a three-year
period.2" In contrast, "each repetition of a continuing nuisance is
considered a separate wrong which commences a new period in

which to bring an action for recovery based upon the new inju-

ry."26 As these disparities indicate, the classification of a nuisance as permanent or continuing can have a substantial effect
upon a party's damages and the claim's outcome.2 7
Most California courts allow nuisance claims for the chemical
contamination of soil and groundwater.28 In allowing chemical
contamination nuisance claims, courts emphasize the individual
nature of each situation.2 9 One California appellate court high-

Beronio v Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 86 Cal 415, 421, 24 P 1093 (1890).
"S Capogeannis v Superior Court, 12 Cal App 4th 668, 677-78, 15 Cal Rptr 2d 796
(Cal App 1993).
Spaulding, 38 Cal 2d at 267.
Rankin v DeBare, 205 Cal 639, 641, 271 P 1050 (1928).
21 Field-Escandon,204 Cal App 3d at 231-32.
2
Williams, 150 Cal at 624.
23 Spaulding, 38 Cal 2d at 267.
Phillipsv City of Pasadena,27 Cal 2d 104, 107, 162 P2d 625 (1945).
Cal Civ Proc Code § 338(b) (West 1982).
Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1217.
'? See G. Nelson Smith III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 Santa Clara L Rev 39, 57
(1995) ("In reality, the primary purpose of determining whether a nuisance or trespass is
continuing or permanent is to establish the outcome of a particular case or the legal effects of certain defenses .... ).
2' Martin Marietta Corp. v Insurance Co. of North America, 40 Cal App 4th 1113,
1132, 47 Cal Rptr 2d 670 (Cal App 1995) ("[Nluisance claims may include wrongful entry
or invasion by pollutants.... The migration of pollutants from one property to another
may constitute. .. a nuisance. ... ."); Resolution Trust Corp. v Rossmoor Corp., 34 Cal
App 4th 93, 99, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 328 (Cal App 1995) ("Failure to clean up contamination
causing ongoing damage to property has been held to constitute ... a nuisance."). See also
Brown and Hansen, 21 Ecol L Q at 696 (cited in note 1).
29 Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1217 ("[Elach case must be determined
upon
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lighted the unique and complex aspects that pollution brings to
traditional nuisance law, acknowledging that chemical contamination cases "do not fit easily into the continuing-use/permanentencroachment dichotomy because the harmful effects of the pollution may continue beyond the termination of the activity that
gave rise to the harm.""
In response to the imprecise criteria for permanent and continuing nuisances, California courts honed their standard of review to a "reasonably abatable" test.3 ' If the plaintiff can reasonably abate the nuisance, considering time, expense, the potential harm the cleanup itself may cause, and any other interests, then the nuisance is classified as continuing; otherwise,
courts deem it permanent. 2
Previously, courts wrestled with a literal abatability standard, as in the case of Spar v Pacific Bell.33 In Spar, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's underground power lines constituted a continuing nuisance." The plaintiff contended that because the defendant could and did remove its telephone lines
from under the plaintiff's property, the nuisance was abatable
and therefore continuing. 5 The court rejected such reasoning,
examining the totality of the circumstances, including the lines'
underground location, the cables' one-hundred-year lifespan, and
the significant chore of removal. 6 California courts later characterized the Spar ruling as the "practical qualification of a tooliteral abatability rule," and adopted its reasonably abatable
standard to examine claims.3 7
The California Supreme Court confirmed the reasonably
abatable criteria in Mangini v Aerojet-General Corp.,38 a case
involving contamination from hazardous waste dumping. The
court endorsed the requirement that "plaintiffs had to prove the
condition could be removed 'by reasonable means and without
its own peculiar circumstances with guidance from, but not straightiacket conformance
with, earlier decisions."). The California Supreme Court held that "[wihether contamination by toxic waste is a permanent or continuing injury... turn[s] on the nature and
extent of the contamination." Mangini, 12 Cal App 4th at 1097, quoting Mangini v
Aerojet-General Corp., 230 Cal App 3d 1125, 1148, 281 Cal Rptr 827 (Cal App 1991).
'0 Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1218.

31 Capogeannis,12 Cal App 4th at 678.
32 Id.

235 Cal App 3d 1480, 1 Cal Rptr 2d 480 (Cal App 1991).

Id at 1482.
Id at 1486.
Id at 1486-88 (finding a permanent nuisance).

37 Capogeannis,12 Cal App 4th at 678.

38 12 Cal 4th 1087, 51 Cal Rptr 2d 272 (1996).
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unreasonable expense' and that 'hardship and cost' were factors."3 9 Moreover, the court held that in cases where the evidence could support either a permanent or continuing nuisance,
the plaintiff could select which type of nuisance to pursue.'
Beck Development Co., Inc. v Southern Pacific Transportation
Co.,
another case of soil contamination, elaborated upon
California's sympathetic yet demanding stance toward continuing
nuisances. The court emphasized that while the plaintiff may
elect to characterize the nuisance as either permanent or continuing when either classification could apply, the evidence must
reasonably support the plaintiff's choice.4 2
Although mandating significant evidentiary support, California courts favor continuing nuisance claims on both equitable
and public policy grounds. The California Supreme Court highlighted such equitable concerns in Baker v Burbank-GlendalePasadena Airport Authority," a case where the plaintiffs
claimed noise from a nearby airport constituted a continuing nuisance." In upholding the claim, the court empathized with the
plaintiff's objections to litigating the action as a permanent nuisance, including the potential res judicata bar to later suits and
California's three-year statute of limitations.4 5 Eight years later,
a California appellate court echoed the Supreme Court's equitable concerns, finding it advisable to protect "the plaintiff from
'contingencies' such as unforeseen future injury and the statute
of limitations itself ....
Courts also place a heavy emphasis on public policy in preferring continuing nuisance claims. Capogeannis v Superior
7 a case involving underground storage
Court,"
tanks contaminating soil and groundwater, exemplifies the courts' awareness of
environmental issues. In reaching its decision, the Capogeannis
court acknowledged the primacy of policy considerations," particularly the goal of remediating existing pollution and preventing future damage:

3' Id at 1099.
40 Baker, 39 Cal 3d at 870.
,' 44 Cal App 4th 1160, 52 Cal Rptr 2d 518 (Cal App 1996).
42 Id at 1217.
,3 39 Cal 3d 862, 218 Cal Rptr 293 (1985).
" Id at 865.
4' Id at 870.
41

Capogeannis, 12 Cal App 4th at 678.
12 Cal App 4th 668, 15 Cal Rptr 2d 796 (Cal App 1993).
Id at 682 ("Our conclusion is influenced primarily by policy considerations.").
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[T]oday's environmental awareness establishes... [that
the absence of a legitimate interest in permitting the
contamination to exist and the contamination's tendency to migrate] support application, in this case, of the
courts' general preference for a finding of continuing
nuisance.... Such a finding will tend to encourage
private abatement, and perhaps monetary cooperation
in abatement efforts, if only to limit successive lawsuits.4
Capogeannis stands as an example of the considerable importance of environmental nuisance claims and California's new
emphasis on encouraging private remediation.
II. CALIFORNIA NEEDS UNIFORM STANDARDS
Despite California's preference for classifying chemical contamination as a continuing nuisance, amorphous evidentiary
requirements hinder plaintiffs' claims. California's muddled jurisprudence, with each court relying upon different criteria, has
created confusion, conflicting judicial results, and costly delays.
By compiling existing evidentiary requirements, the "Plaintiff's
Checklist" attempts to ameliorate litigants' plight and serve as
the basis for future nuisance criteria.
A. The Need for Standards
California courts have yet to define standards for distinguishing permanent and continuing nuisance claims in chemical
contamination cases. In Beck Development Co., Inc. v Southern
Pacific Transportation Co.,' the court's lament that "[t]here is
no short and all-inclusive rule for distinguishing between permanent and continuing nuisances" illustrates California's situation.51 The California Supreme Court's most recent nuisance
contamination decision, Mangini v Aerojet-General Corp.,2 echoed the formless criteria facing plaintiffs. The court's guidance
that "something less than total decontamination may suffice to
show abatability,"' fell far short of the precise criteria plaintiffs
need. The court's attempt to define a continuing nuisance by,
Id.
o 44 Cal App 4th 1160, 52 Cal Rptr 2d 518 (Cal App 1996).

49

5' Id at 1217.
12

"

12 Cal 4th 1087, 51 Cal Rptr 2d 272 (1996).

Id at 1098.
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what it is not, noting "we do not agree that mere technological
feasibility proves abatability," 4 also left plaintiffs without sufficient standards. One commentator recently summarized the vexing dilemma of distinguishing permanent and continuing nuisances:
Unfortunately, without any sort of statutory guidance,
courts have been unable to fully articulate exactly what
information must be provided by a plaintiff to meet his
legal burden.... [Courts are often] forced to hypothesize how much evidence they believe is sufficient to
present the case to the jury. Requiring the courts to
make such technical decisions for purposes of assessing
damages extends many courts beyond their expertise
and further establishes why a uniform statutory standard for environmental nuisance... claims needs to be
established."
Although commentators have identified the need for standards,
they, like the courts, have failed to articulate precise guidelines.
California's lack of standards for the continuing/permanent
nuisance controversy leads to conflicting judicial outcomes. Two
leading California Appellate Court cases, Beck Development and
Capogeannis v Superior Court,56 illustrate the differing results
courts have reached under similar circumstances. In Beck Development, the plaintiff argued that subsurface oil contamination
under property intended for residential development constituted
a continuing nuisance. 7 In rejecting this claim, the court focused on the lack of harm the contamination caused the plaintiffs58 and the uncertainty of remediating the pollution.59
The plaintiffs in Capogeannis fared considerably better. Like
Beck Development, Capogeannisdealt with subsurface contamination, specifically, fuel leaking from underground storage tanks.' °
Raising almost identical concerns as Beck Development,
Capogeannisalso critically noted the lack of harm the contamina-

Id at 1099.

G. Nelson Smith III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in EnvironmentalLitigation:
Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 Santa Clara L Rev 39, 64 (1995).
'6 12 Cal App 4th 668, 15 Cal Rptr 2d 796 (Cal App 1993).
44 Cal App 4th at 1216.
Id at 1221 ("There is no evidence that the substance, in situs, is injurious or offensive to persons on the property.").
" Id. ("The record is also sparse about the feasibility and burdens of abatement.").
12 Cal App 4th at 672.
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tion caused the plaintiffs"' and the uncertainty of remediation
efforts. 2 The cases' parallels end with the courts' discordant judgments. Whereas Beck Development denied the plaintiffs claim
due to insufficient evidence," Capogeannis endorsed the basis of
the plaintiffs claims." Instead of emphasizing the lack of evidence, as did Beck Development, Capogeannis focused on policy
concerns, lauding the importance of decontaminating the property and providing incentives for private remediation efforts." The
courts also diverged on the abatability issue, with Capogeannis
downplaying the plaintiffs uncertain cleanup plans, highlighting:
instead the importance of swift remediation." The Capogeannis
court ultimately rested its holding not upon the harm, or lack.
thereof, to the individuals, but upon the damage to the environment. 7
Even in claims against activities conducted under the auspic-.
es of a public utility, described as the clearest cases of permanent
nuisance," California courts produce inconsistent results. In
Spar v Pacific Bell69 and Field-Escandon v DeMann,7 9 plaintiffs
claimed that public utility pipes buried beneath their properties
constituted continuing nuisances.7' The plaintiff in Spar particu-.
larly noted the defendant's removal of the buried lines as a clear
sign of an abatable and therefore continving nuisance.7" Never.theless, both the Spar and Field-Escandon courts found the
utilities' pipes to be permanent nuisances, in each case noting
the intrusion's public benefit.73

61 Id at 683 ("[We find no indication that in and of itself the contamination was in

any sense harmful (or that its continuation would be harmful) to the Capogeannises or tA)
their property interests . . ").
62 Id at 682 ("[Ilt may be inferred from the record as a whole that
the reduction will
be a slow and uncertain process.").
44 Cal App 4th at 1222-23.
12 Cal App 4th at 683-84.
Id at 682.

Id ("That in this case abatement efforts may take considerable time and may never
be wholly successful should not be permitted to dictate a result that would lessen incentives to proceed as promptly and effectively as possible to abate the contamination.").
67

Id.
Spaulding v Cameron, 38 Cal 2d 265, 267, 239 P2d 625 (1952).

9 235 Cal App 3d 1480, 1 Cal Rptr 2d 480 (Cal App 1991).

70
71

204 Cal App 3d 228, 251 Cal Rptr 49 (Cal App 1988).
Spar, 235 Cal App 3d at 1482-83; Field-Escandon,204 Cal App 3d at 231.

72 235 Cal App 3d at 1486.
73 Id ("The [buried telephone lines with useful lives estimated at one hundred years]
were intentionally placed to provide service to the public indefinitely."); Field-Escandon,
204 Cal App 3d at 234 ("[Tlhe sewer pipe was intended to be a permanent structure for
sewage disposal [and the only source of plumbing facilities] from the DeManns' house to
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Other courts, however, do not accord special status to public
endeavors and have refused to classify all governmental actions
as permanent nuisances. In Baker v Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena
Airport Authority,74 the plaintiffs asserted that the local airport
was a continuing nuisance.7 5 While acknowledging the importance and permanence of the airport's functions, the court criticized the use of public benefit as the sole criterion for determining nuisance claims, stating that "public policy militates against
defining a nuisance as permanent or continuing on the basis of
privilege alone."76 Ultimately, the court found that although it
could not enjoin the airport operations entirely, the facility's
public nature did not prevent the court from classifying it as a
continuing nuisance."
In Phillips v City of Pasadena," the California Supreme
Court reviewed another case of public action, the city's roadblock
of a private lane-.9 The plaintiff argued that Pasadena's obstruction of the only access to his property constituted a continuing
nuisance because the barrier could be removed at any time."0
Despite the municipality's arguments of public necessity, the
court agreed with the plaintiff."' Thus, even activities under
public auspices are not immune from the confusion California's
ambiguous nuisance jurisprudence has produced. Courts characterized a nuisance that had already been abated, the sewer line
in Spar, as permanent, while classifying persistent airport noise,
the sounds in Baker, and a confining solid structure, the barrier
in Phillips, as continuing nuisances.
In addition to incongruous rulings, California's ill-defined
criteria often result in expensive delays. Mangini exemplified the
effects of bureaucratic procrastination: "[The] governmental investigation [in this case] has not yet reached the point where a
health risk assessment can be performed to determine acceptable
cleanup levels for the particular site. Thus, plaintiffs cannot rely
on any regulatory agency as setting the standard for abatement ... ."2 The consequent additional trial preparations and

the city sewer drain.").
7, 39 Cal 3d 862, 218 Cal Rptr 293 (1985).
7 Id at 865.
76 Id at 871.
" Id at 873.
'8
'9

81

27 Cal 2d 104, 162 P2d 625 (1945).
Id at 106.
Id at 107.
Id at 107-08.

'2 Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1098.
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postponements also result in escalating costs, further debilitating
plaintiffs' ability to continue litigation.'

California's vague standards most severely prejudice plaintiffs who fail to fulfill courts' amorphous criteria. Both Beck De5 demonstrate
velopment" and Mangini"
courts' intolerance of

unsubstantiated charges, barring claims lacking substantial evidence.
In short, the pervasive lack of standards causes erratic results, prolongs expensive proceedings, and ultimately may doom
plaintiffs' efforts to litigate chemical contamination nuisance
claims. California needs clear, workable standards to resolve this
muddled jurisprudence and ensure equitable, efficient, and effective outcomes.
B. A "Plaintiff's Checklist" of Existing Standards
While uniform standards may not exist at present, California
courts consider numerous factors in evaluating continuing nuisance claims.
Courts have adopted three minimal standards. First, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence all the necessary facts to establish a continuing nuisance."6 Second, courts
hold any insufficiency of evidence against the plaintiff. 7 Third,
the plaintiffs ultimate burden is to prove "that the nuisance can
be remedied at a reasonable cost by reasonable means."' As the
above criteria illustrate, many terms remain to be defined in

developing appropriate standards.

8 One commentator noted that "[tihe cost of determining the extent of contamination
and developing a remediation plan, or of determining that the contamination cannot be
remedied, can be substantial, and the time required can be lengthy." James B. Brown and
Glen C. Hansen, Nuisance Law and Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Contamination: Plugging the Hole in the Statutes, 21 Ecol L Q 643, 699 (1994).
' In Beck Development, the court argued that the plaintiff's failure to present compelling evidence of ongoing damage barred the continuing nuisance claim:
[U]nder the abatability test we find insufficient evidence to support the claim
that the contamination under Beck's property should be characterized as a continuing rather than permanent nuisance.... [T]he evidence does not establish
that the buried substance is migrating to other properties or into public water
supplies, or that it is otherwise injurious or offensive to the public.
44 Cal App 4th at 1221.
In Mangini, the California Supreme Court also critically reviewed the plaintiffs
evidence, concluding: "On this record, there is no substantial evidence that the nuisance is
abatable." 12 Cal 4th at 1103.
'6

87

Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1096-97.

Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1221.
Id at 1222, quoting Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1102-03.
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Beck Development provides some insight into the important
considerations for assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. 9 In
evaluating chemical contamination as a permanent or continuing
nuisance, the court highlighted the "feasible means of, and alternatives to, abatement, the time and expense involved, legitimate
competing interests, and the benefits and detriments to be gained
by abatement or suffered if abatement is denied." While failing
to specify exact tests or dollar figures, the Beck Development
guidelines emphasize those areas in which plaintiffs must provide evidence to prosecute their claims.
1. Plaintiffs'pitfalls.
In continuing nuisance cases, plaintiffs' pitfalls include presenting minimal evidence, defining a nuisance by negative implication, and gathering only rudimentary information on injuries or
abatement.
California courts require more than minimal levels of evidence to prove chemical contamination as a continuing nuisance.9 1 Bare allegations do not sustain a continuing nuisance
claim,92 nor do simple showings that the property is contaminated and that technology exists to decontaminate the property. 3
Even demonstrating interference with the use that the plaintiff
desires, without any further detriment, does not establish a continuing nuisance." Such minimally supported suits have drawn
a sharp rebuke from the California Supreme Court: "[T]he
plaintiffs complete failure to offer substantial evidence of the
cost and reasonableness of remediation leads ineluctably to the
conclusion that the nuisance at issue is 'permanent."95
The second category of unsuccessful litigation strategy involves attempts to establish a continuing nuisance by negative

"

Id at 1220.
Id at 1221.

Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1103.
Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1217 ("A plaintiff cannot simply allege that a
nuisance is continuing in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations ... .
'3 Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1099.
94 Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1221. Beck Development provides an example
of such limited interference: the plaintiff's only alleged hardship was its inability to utilize
all the property for its highest and best use, that of development of single-family residences on completely decontaminated property. The court even proposed an available compromise to mitigate Beck's damages, suggesting that Beck develop single-family dwellings on
some of the land, while devoting the remaining land to multi-family units. However, Beck
maintained its inflexible stance, prompting the court to find insufficient evidence of a
continuous injury and to declare the contamination a permanent nuisance. Id at 1221-23.
9' Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1093-94.
91
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implication. In Spar v Pacific Bell, the defendant actually removed the offending underground telephone lines before the
trial." The plaintiff seized upon the defendant's action, arguing
that because the lines were removable, the nuisance could not be
permanent and therefore had to be continuing.9 7 The court disagreed, stating that the defendant's removal of the lines, standing by itself, did not establish Lhe necessary aspects of a continuing nuisance and denied plaintiffs claim.9" This tactic of definition by negative implication remains common" because courts
have failed to establish appropriate, workable criteria for permanent and continuing nuisances; consequently, plaintiffs and defendants alike are left to grope for standards in the intellectual
dark.
The final admonition to plaintiffs is very simple: Gather as
much information before trial as possible, since conceding uncertainty about the extent, harm, or future nature of the pollution
may undermine a case. Mangini features a cavalcade of admissions that ultimately doomed the plaintiff's case.1 "° Plaintiffs
confessed in their briefs, at trial, in closing arguments, and on
appeal that they had no evidence of the extent of the pollution. 1°' In rebuking the plaintiffs' unsubstantiated claim on appeal, the California Supreme Court shed further light upon the
factors necessary to prove chemical contamination as a continuing nuisance:
The result of the uncertainty regarding the extent of
decontamination is that it is uncertain whether the
nuisance is abatable. Thus, we do not know how much
land or water has to be decontaminated. We do not
know how deep the contamination would have to go. We
235 Cal App 3d at 1482.
Id at 1486.
9

Id.

In addition to Spar, see Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1102. The decision in Mangini,
where the defendant allegedly disposed of toxic waste illegally, offers another example in.
which a plaintiff attempted to define a continuing nuisance by negative implication. The
plaintiffs claimed that nuisances that were illegal or violative of government standards
could not be permanent, and that consequently courts must classify the nuisances as
continuing. 12 Cal 4th at 1102. The court rejected both arguments, holding first that;
"

illegality did not define the type of nuisance, and second that pollution levels above
government standards did not automatically create a continuing nuisance, but rather
presented a question of fact. Id.
" 12 Cal 4th at 1097-98.
'ot Id. Even the plaintiffs' own expert admitted that "[t]he heart of the situation is

that there's not enough known about the site yet to asses [sic] what remedial measures
need to be done [ I [and] can be done out there effectively." Id at 1097.
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have no idea how much it would cost but know only
that it would cost unascertainable millions of dollars.
On this record, there 10is
no substantial evidence that the
2
nuisance is abatable.
In short, because nuisance cases are fact-sensitive, plaintiffs
should be particularly diligent in amassing as much evidence as
possible about the extent of the contamination and cost of
remediation, as later admissions about deficiencies in such evidence could defeat the plaintiff's claim.
2. Plaintiffs checklist.
Despite California's amorphous nuisance law, courts consistently look to government standards, expert testimony, and costbenefit analysis in determining permanent/continuing nuisance
cases. This "Plaintiff's Checklist" compiles existing evidentiary
standards to aid current litigants and serve as the basis for future criteria.
The single most important factor among existing standards
in establishing chemical contamination as a continuing nuisance
is compliance with government standards. Courts consistently
look to the responsible government agency to define excessive
pollution levels, and plaintiffs who use government findings favorable to their cause usually emerge triumphant, 3 while
those who attempt to go against the grain frequently lose.'"
Capogeannis illustrates both courts' reliance on government
standards and the standards' persuasive weight: "We are satisfied to presume that cleanup standards set by responsible public
agencies sufficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can
be done to abate contamination in particular cases. As judges we
will not presume to insist upon absolutes these agencies do not
require.""5 In essence, courts believe that government standards are ideal, institutionally superior to a court's own ad hoc
guidelines, and even preferable to outside expert opinions.
Consequently, courts often treat government findings as a
deciding factor in nuisance cases. Wilshire Westwood Associates v
Atlantic Richfield Co."° illustrates the potent effect of agency

Id at 1103.
"03See Capogeannis, 12 Cal App 4th at 680; Wilshire Westwood Associates v Atlantic
Richfield Co., 20 Cal App 4th 732, 744-45, 24 Cal Rptr 2d 562 (Cal App 1993).
-' See Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1098; Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1222-23.
0
12 Cal App 4th at 683.
6 20 Cal App 4th 732, 24 Cal Rptr 2d 562 (Cal App 1993).
"02
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standards.1"7 In Wilshire, the plaintiff alleged that defendant
Atlantic Richfield's gasoline contamination constituted a continuing nuisance.l"e The court found the Department of Health
Services' findings, set forth in a letter, that "the cleanup of the
gasoline spill... [was] adequate and complete, and [] appellants
could proceed with their construction project," conclusive. It held,
"This letter demonstrates that the nuisance was abatable, and for
this reason can be characterized as a continuing nuisance... ."19 The court thus relied on the agency's assessment
as the determinative issue in evaluating the continuing nuisance
claim.
In light of the deference courts afford to agency standards,
plaintiffs who ignore or contravene these bureaucratic guidelines
usually do not prevail."0 For example, in Beck Development, the
plaintiffs requested cleanup relief not only in excess of government mandates, but actually against the local agency's wishes."' The only type of decontamination that the plaintiffs wanted involved excavation of the entire property and removal of the
polluted soil."' Yet the two responsible government units opposed bringing the polluted soil to the surface." 3 In objecting to
the plaintiffs proposal, the agencies raised concerns regarding
"the handling, treatment and disposal of the excavated soil
[which would] require close regulatory supervision." 4 The
court ultimately barred the plaintiffs planned undertaking, holding that "remediation as demanded by Beck would be significantly burdensome and from a public and regulatory point of view
may not be the most advisable option.""5
In addition to the preeminence of government regulations,
other factors, including expert testimony and the reasonable cost
of abatement, also play an important role in evaluating nuisance
claims. While government findings are often conclusive, courts
require at least some expert testimony to support the plaintiffs
case. For example, in Capogeannis,the plaintiffs relied success107 See also Capogeannis, 12 Cal App 4th at 683 ("When [the] demands [of the regulatory agencies] have been met, so far as the Capogeannises are concerned the nuisance will
be abated.")
108 20 Cal App 4th at 744-45.

09 Id at 745.
110 In addition to Beck Development, see Mangini, 12 Cal 4th at 1103-04.
1'

44 Cal App 4th at 1221-23.
Id at 1221.

113

Id at 1221-22.

.

114 Id at 1222.
15

44 Cal App 4th at 1222.
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fully upon the declarations of a registered geologist and registered environmental assessor for expert testimony. " ' Arcade
Water District v United States similarly affirmed the value of expert testimony.1 1 7 Capogeannis and Arcade demonstrate that, in
contrast to plaintiff's bare allegations in Beck Development"' or
the minimal levels of proof in Mangini,"9 when plaintiffs offer
significant, credible, and professional evidence, courts accord substantial weight to such expert testimony.
Beyond expert testimony, courts particularly emphasize cost
in assessing the reasonableness of abatement. Beck Development
illustrates this attention to cost. There, plaintiff's exorbitant
demand to excavate the entire property did not fare well when
the court weighed the relative expenses and benefits of the situation:
It was generally agreed that the cost of remediation
would greatly exceed the value of the land after
remediation. In considering the relative benefits and
burdens of remediation, the comparison must be between the costs of remediation and the actual detriment
to the plaintiff from a failure to remediate. 1"
Affirming the importance of cost to the continuing nuisance equation, the California Supreme Court in Mangini urged the plaintiff
to provide an estimate "to prove the condition could be removed
'by reasonable means and without unreasonable expense' and
that 'hardship and cost' were factors." 2' The court also emphasized the importance of quantifying the cost of remediation.'2 2
Thus, although no court has articulated comprehensive standards, the current "Plaintiff's Checklist" includes government
standards favorable to a continuing nuisance, expert testimony
establishing the extent and abatability of the pollution, and detailed cost estimates for remediation.

...12 Cal App 4th at 680.

940 F2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir 1991). In Arcade, a California water district sued the
U.S. for a military laundry's alleged pollution of a local well and water supply. The
plaintiff prevailed in part because it provided an affidavit from its engineer attesting to
the potentially abatable nature of the well's contamination.
44 Cal App 4th at 1221-22.
"' 12 Cal 4th at 1097-98.
44 Cal App 4th at 1222.
117

,21 12 Cal 4th at 1099.
12

Id.
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III. UNIFORM STANDARDS SHOULD COMBINE GOVERNMENT
EVALUATION AND PRIVATE REMEDIATION TO PROTECT THE

ENVIRONMENT

California has emerged as a leader in chemical-contamination nuisance litigation. It should continue this leadership by
passing uniform statutory standards to define when environmental pollution constitutes a continuing or permanent nuisance.

Courts need clear, cohesive, and practical standards. Delays in
establishing nuisance criteria are unacceptably costly to litigants
and the environment.
The California legislature should adopt uniform statutory
standards emphasizing government evaluation and private
1
remediation.m
This Comment suggests a two-part scheme:
first, mandatory and prompt government assessment of the pollution, its extent, and the possibility of abatement; and second,
testimony from private experts on the overall costs and benefits
of remediation in accordance with pre-determined monetary limits. This proposal conforms with the underlying policy standards
articulated in Beck Development v Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 2 4 of evaluating the significance of the injury, the practicability of abatement, and the project's cumulative cost.125 By
combining evidence from the public and private sectors, courts
can use comprehensive, timely, and standardized information to
decide the nuisance issue.
A. Government Assessment
Timing poses perhaps the most difficult issue facing plaintiffs. Unlike typical nuisances such as blaring noise or pungent
odors, environmental contamination, often unseen and underground, is particularly difficult to identify. Furthermore, the
harm may not appear for years after the incident, existing technology may not be able to identify ongoing damage, or presently
benign chemicals may become toxic. All of these elements may
combine to make damage undetectable for prolonged periods.126

"23
See G. Nelson Smith III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 Santa Clara L Rev 39, 40-41
(1995) (recognizing the need for uniform statutory standards).
124 44 Cal App 4th 1160, 52 Cal Rptr 2d 518 (Cal App 1996).
2

Id at 1220-21.

A recent California appellate court decision acknowledged the plaintiff's timing dilemma in continuing/permanent nuisance cases. Santa Fe Partnershipv ARCO Products
Co., 46 Cal App 4th 967, 982, 54 Cal Rptr 2d 214 (Cal App 1996) ("An attempt to classify
126
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Consequently, plaintiffs often err in timing chemical contamination cases, waiting too long to bring their suits and exceeding
California's three-year statute of limitations. 2 7
In other cases, courts rebuff plaintiffs who attempt to bring
their claims too soon. Courts often refuse on quasi-ripeness
grounds to pass judgment until the appropriate government entity has assessed the site."2 Consequently, plaintiffs must deftly
time their litigation to catch this shifting and shrinking window
of opportunity between often slow bureaucratic procedures and
the immovable statute of limitations.
Uniform government standards could alleviate this timing
problem. A California statute could mandate government test
results within a certain time period and toll the statute of limitations until the assessment concluded. A plaintiff could trigger the
government evaluation by filing papers notifying the court and
the defendant of the plaintiffs intention to litigate. Under this
approach, the government would have sufficient, but not unlimited, time to conduct a thorough analysis of the contaminated site.
As the courts have demonstrated, such neutral, informed findings
are often decisive in assessing the scope and abatability of environmental contamination."2 Further, rather than engaging in
expensive and confusing partisan battles of experts, courts simply
could receive the unbiased opinion of responsible agencies. These
local agencies generally have extensive knowledge of the sur-.
rounding terrain and substantial experience evaluating chemical
contamination claims, making them ideally suited and perhaps
even more knowledgeable than so-called "experts" hired by litigants. Outside expert testimony could add to, but not supplant,
the required government findings. Government standards, set by
trained professionals, are superior not only to each side's often
conflicting results, but also to each court's own ad hoc or nonexistent standards.
Admittedly, mandating government testing for every nuisance claim still may result in delays and escalating public costs.
chemical pollution as a permanent or temporary nuisance is further complicated by the
presence of rapidly changing scientific technology. Scientific knowledge enables society to
successfully clean up pollution once thought to be permanent; it also reveals hidden
dangers in chemicals once thought to be safe . . .
127
'

Cal Civ Proc Code § 338(b) (West 1982).
See Mangini v Aerojet-General Corp., 12 Cal 4th 1087, 1098, 51 Cal Rptr 2d 272

(1996).
129 See Wilshire Westwood Associates v Atlantic Richfield Co., 20 Cal App 4th 732, 74445, 24 Cal Rptr 2d 562 (Cal App 1993); Capogeannis v Superior Court, 12 Cal App 4th
668, 683, 15 Cal Rptr 2d 796 (Cal App 1993).
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Environmental activists might attack the statute on the grounds
that while government officials dicker over test results, the pollution will continue to harm the environment. Although some delay
may occur until the agencies report their conclusions, uniform
standards could minimize even this procrastination with earlier
deadlines. At least under the proposed government evaluation,
the review tolls the statute of limitations, preserving the opportunity for a permanent nuisance claim and affording the possibility
of some remediation. Currently, the all-or-nothing approach with
California's three-year statute of limitations may permanently
bar unsuspecting plaintiffs. Mandatory government investigation
would create a bright-line rule, ensuring that plaintiffs would not
commence the trial before the government findings were complete, while avoiding the delays and court costs of premature
litigation.
Some critics may contest the compulsory government intervention and concomitant spending that will result. Again, although the cost to the public trough may increase, the gains from
a faster response and a cleaner environment could offset the
initial public detriment. Furthermore, in comparison to the private costs that litigants already bear in attempting to decipher
the current amorphous standards, such public costs probably
would appear minimal.
Other detractors may contend that the costs of nuisance
claims should remain internalized because the public should not
pay for the potentially frivolous claims that will not prove detrimental to the environment. Further, critics may contend that the
proposal forces the government to bolster every plaintiffs case.
For example, opponents may assert that the only factor distinguishing the environmental review from a law requiring the
government to investigate personal injury cases is the possible
public benefit from abatement on private land. In response, the
statute could mandate a calculation of government costs and
either divide those costs equally between each litigant in reasonable but unsuccessful claims, or assess the entirety to the losing
party in frivolous litigation. Such cost shifting may ameliorate
the strain upon limited government resources.
On a broader level, despite the private nature of the litigation, many would argue that it is both the government's responsibility and in its interest to protect the environment. Groundwater
and air quality represent common goods appropriate for government management. Furthermore, the migratory nature of contamination could threaten not only public lands and resources,
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but also public health, which is certainly an area of government
concern. The court in Capogeannis v Superior Court30 recognized pollution's dangerous migratory nature and broader public
implications, noting that "environmental contamination is no
respecter of property lines and is a legitimate subject of grave
concern to society as a whole . . ,.131 Since the government has
demonstrated a willingness to mandate environmental cleanups
on private land, increasing an agency's evaluative authority
seems a logical and beneficial progression. Additionally, by facilitating private parties' nuisance suits, perhaps the public agencies
would have less of an enforcement burden under environmental
regulations, thereby resulting in budgetary savings.
On balance, the uniform statutory standard should mandate
government testing of the extent and abatability of chemical
contamination within a specified period and toll the statute of
limitations for the duration of the government's assessment.
B. Private Sector
While the government should evaluate the contamination
upon notice of the plaintiffs intention to file suit, the standards
should require the litigants to submit their plans to a cost-benefit
analysis. Although local agencies may be more skilled in considering objective pollution levels, the affected parties may be better
suited to estimate subjective valuations such as the landowner's
inability to utilize the property. California's nuisance statute
should compel plaintiffs and defendants to provide estimates
from professionals summarizing both the remediation's cost and
the property's value before and after decontamination.
A cost estimate is crucial to analyze equitably the plaintiffs
detriment and the fiscal prudence of remediation.'3 2 As Beck
Development illustrates, the latter is a particularly important criterion in cleanup efforts.'33 The statute could set fixed limits on
what constitutes a "reasonably" abatable continuing nuisance.
For example, the legislature could decide that a remedy exceeding 150 percent of the decontaminated land's value would be excessive and therefore fail to qualify as reasonably abatable." 4

12 Cal App 4th 668, 15 Cal Rptr 2d 796 (Cal App 1993).

31Id at 683.
13'

Beck Development, 44 Cal App 4th at 1222.

Id.
The court in Beck Developent demonstrated a willingness to allow some
remediation costs in excess of the property's worth, but barred exorbitant damages far in
'3'4
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Likewise, the statute could state that the costs of remediation
could not exceed twice the monetary detriment to the plaintiff for
the nuisance to qualify as reasonably abatable. At a minimum,
the plaintiff could recover for the actual detriment, while the
statute could allow the remediation costs to exceed the detriment
to the plaintiff as both a punitive measure and as a policy statement to emphasize the importance of a toxic-free environment.
Beck Development also serves as precedent for reasonable limits,
denying the plaintiffs claim where "the costs of remediation
would far exceed, by many multiples, the actual detriment that
would be suffered if remediation is denied."135 The preset limits
would afford a measure of balance and efficiency by not permitting exorbitant remediation costs to result in cases involving
minor detriments or land of little value.
This method of allowing private cost-benefit analyses would
also foster another policy interest stated in Beck Development,
flexible remedies.136 Instead of advocating uncompromising and
often unduly expensive cleanups, the standards would encourage
plaintiffs to pursue more reasonable approaches to comply with
the proposed statute's cost requirement. Effective yet fiscally
responsible efforts would achieve the goal of decontaminating the
property in a more economical manner. By conserving a
defendant's resources, this approach might permit a net increase
of additional cleanups at other sites.
Critics of this approach may argue that if the government
really wants to make policy statements and impose punitive
measures, it should punish the perpetrators at any cost. However, the proposed statute only addresses civil suits; the criminal
penalties perpetrators would face provide additional deterrence.
Other non-governmental punishments such as stigma damages,1 37 shame, economic boycotts, and a potential public relations
disaster also would discourage polluters. Furthermore, government punishment must have limits, otherwise it risks destroying

excess of the land's value. Id.
13 Id.
3 44 Cal App 4th at 1221 (encouraging plaintiff Beck to consider alternate development plans).
137 Some jurisdictions allow stigma damages, monetary awards to compensate for a
site's injured reputation and consequent reduced marketability, but only for indefinite,
permanent nuisances. See FDIC v Jackson-Shaw PartnersNo. 46, Ltd., 850 F Supp 839
(N D Cal 1994). However, other courts are reluctant to award such damages "due to the
amorphous nature of public fears of contaminated land and the inherent uncertainty and
speculativeness of the extent, as well as the existence, of the stigma." Santa Fe Partnrership, 46 Cal App 4th at 984.
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the defendant from whom it wishes to extract compensation and,
more importantly, rehabilitate the defendant into an environmentally friendly entity.
Other opponents may assert that a court cannot place a
"value" on land, especially considering the variability of aesthetic
qualities. Admittedly, determining a land's overall "value," including its subjective, commercial, aesthetic, and environmental
worth, is challenging.1" However, courts already must establish
some assessment of a land's value to determine culpability. While
it may be imprecise to assess a property's subjective qualities,
without any valuation at all courts could never estimate damages
and compensate successful plaintiffs. Further, plaintiffs may
facilitate courts' estimates through their own expert testimony
and cost-benefit analyses to ameliorate the valuation problem.
Entities outside the litigation also could file amicus curiae briefs
to support the land's environmental valuation.
Lastly, detractors may assert that the government simply
should preserve the environment at any price. While preservation
at any cost may send a message to polluters, it may have unintended effects. If excessive judgments bankrupt companies, no
decontamination might ever occur. Alternatively, such large damage awards might have a chilling effect on industry, discouraging
the economic growth that generates the tax dollars the government expends to monitor and protect the environment. The proposed standard would promote conservation of both the environment and the economic resources needed to preserve it.
CONCLUSION

Nuisance claims are an effective weapon in the growing
struggle to prevent chemical contamination. California courts are
at the forefront of this movement, broadly supporting plaintiffs'
litigation in continuing nuisance claims. Unfortunately, despite
the state's favorable stance toward continuing nuisance suits,
California's lack of criteria for distinguishing between permanent
and continuing nuisances has created inconsistent judicial out'38 Some courts also calculate land's "existence value." See Texas Committee on Natural Resources v Bergland, 433 F Supp 1235, 1249 (E D Tex 1977); Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group v Butz, 401 F Supp 1276, 1311 (D Minn 1975). Courts define existence value as "that feeling some people have just knowing that somewhere there remains
a true wilderness untouched by human hands. .. ." Butz, 401 F Supp at 1311. In chemical contamination cases, environmentalists may contend that existence value encompasses
knowing that pristine land exists even if they themselves do not use the property or even
know of its location.
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comes, expensive delays, and ineffective environmental protection. Issues of ripeness, insufficient evidence, and amorphous
guidelines plague plaintiffs' efforts to remediate migrating pollution.
California should continue its leadership in the environmental arena by enacting a uniform statutory standard for distinguishing chemical contamination as a permanent or continuing
nuisance. This standard would mandate government testing
within a specified period and toll the statute of limitations until
the responsible local agencies complete their assessments. The
local governmental units' conclusions would represent trained
and experienced analysis and alleviate the confusion of courts'
reliance upon their own ad hoc criteria. Next, the standard would
require litigants to hire professionals to assess the costs of
remediation and the land's value after decontamination. The
court would then apply statutory limits to determine whether the
proposed cleanup efforts were "reasonable" and whether the nuisance was continuing. On balance, this method would combine
the government's expert, neutral assessment with the litigants'
ability to fashion flexible, effective remedies. California's chemical contamination nuisance statute would provide clarity to the
legal system, deter potential violators, and ensure environmental
protection into the twenty-first century.

